LANDLORD AND TENANT-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-LANDLORD'S IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO STRICT

TORT LIABILITY FOR TENANT'S PERSONAL INJURIEs-Dwyer v.

Sky-

line Apartments, Inc., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
For fifteen years, Josephine Dwyer was a tenant in the multiplefamily garden apartments owned by Skyline Apartments, Inc. On
February 8, 1971, she was burned when the hot water faucet on her
bathtub fell out of the tile wall, pouring scalding water over her body.'
Suffering from burns, Mrs. Dwyer brought an action against the defendant landlord to recover for personal injuries. The only witness at
2
the trial was the plaintiff, who described the faucet as "very corroded."
The plaintiff added that she had not known about the dangerous condition before the accidents since the corroded portion of the fixture was
a latent defect 4 located within the wall. Since she had experienced no
prior difficulty with the plumbing system and had no knowledge of the
defective faucet, no complaint had ever been made to the landlord. 5
The trial court,6 sitting without a jury, entered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for $1500. Despite the lack of actual or constructive
knowledge by the landlord necessary for establishing liability in negligence, the trial judge held that the landlord was strictly liable to the
tenant under a continuing implied covenant of habitability. 7
On appeal, the appellate division in Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments,

Inc.8 reversed with directions to enter judgment in favor of the de1 Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 51, 301 A.2d 463, 464 (App.
Div.), afl'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
2 123 N.J. Super. at 51, 301 A.2d at 464.
3

Id.

4 A latent defect is one that is hidden and not discoverable by reasonable inspection,
whereas a patent defect is one that is easily observed or discovered. Roberts v. Rogers, 129
Neb. 298, 302-03, 261 N.W. 354, 356-57 (1935). A tenant is expected to make an inspection
and in accepting the premises in a patently defective condition, assumes the risk. The
landlord's liability for latent defects has traditionally been limited to situations where
the landlord, having knowledge or notice of the hidden danger and an opportunity to
repair, has either failed to make repairs or concealed the condition from the tenant.
Cf. Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 63, 253 A.2d 167, 170 (1969); Faber v. Creswick, 31
N.J. 234, 242, 156 A.2d 252, 256 (1959); Schnatterer v. Bamberger & Co., 81 NJ.L. 558,
560-61, 79 A. 324, 325 (Ct. Err. & App. 1911). See generally Harkrider, Tort Liability of a
Landlord, 26 MIcH. L REv. 260, 264-75 (1927).
5 123 N.J. Super. at 51, 301 A.2d at 464.
6 The case was tried before the Honorable Paul R. Huot, J.D.C., in the Bergen
County District Court on May 3, 1972.
7 123 N.J. Super. at 51, 301 A.2d at 464.
8 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App. Div.), aff'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1
(1973).
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fendant landlord, 9 holding that there was no liability for the personal
injuries suffered by a tenant from a defective condition under the control of the landlord when the landlord neither knew nor could have
discovered the condition. 10 The court held that the landlord's implied
covenant or warranty of habitability" concerned only issues of rent and
eviction and had no applicability to a personal injury action. 12 The
court specifically rejected the plaintiff's alternative theory that the
landlord is strictly liable in tort for a tenant's injuries, finding no basis
in analogy or policy for the extension of products liability principles
to the lessor of dwelling houses. 13 After granting plaintiff's petition for
certification,' 14 the Supreme Court of New Jersey in a memorandum
opinion affirmed "substantially for the reasons expressed by the Appel15
late Division."'
In deciding the liability of a landlord to his tenant, the key element
of judicial consideration has traditionally been the character of the
lease. While the lessee's rights were originally contractual in nature' 6
and his property interest was characterized as personal rather than
real, 17 by the sixteenth century the lease was recognized as a conveyance
123 N.J. Super. at 56, 301 A.2d at 467.
at 53, 301 A.2d at 465.
11 "Habitability" is not a boundless concept. Limits have been articulated by several
courts. See, e.g., Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 261 A.2d 413 (L. Div.
1970).
[P]roof of breach of the warranty of habitability will not be an easy burden for
the tenant to bear. Not every transient inconvenience of living attributable to
the condition of the premises will be a legitimate subject of litigation. The warranty is one of habitability and is not a warranty against all inconvenience or
discomfort.
id. at 403, 261 A.2d at 417. Accord, Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469-70, 308 A.2d
17, 22 (1973).
Not every defect or inconvenience will be deemed to constitute a breach of the
covenant of habitability. The condition complained of must be such as truly to
render the premises uninhabitable in the eyes of a reasonable person.
Id. at 469, 308 A.2d at 22.
12 123 N.J. Super. at 54-55, 301 A.2d at 466.
13 Id. at 55-56, 301 A.2d at 466-67.
14 63 N.J. 427, 307 A.2d 613 (1973).
15 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
16 The lease originated as a-contract made in an attempt to evade the usury laws:
Considerably before 1200, terms of years appear to have had some use among
important landowners as devices for securing the repayment of loans. This function disappeared and husbandry leases gradually became frequent as a device
whereby important landowners contracted for the working of their lands by
the nonlandowning "lower classes."
221 [1], at 177 (1973) (footnote omitted). See
2 R. POWELL, TiE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11, at 202 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 111-12 (2d ed. 1898); 3 G. THOMPSON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1016, at 7 (repl. 1959).
17 For purposes of descent and distribution and execution of judgments, leases are
9

10 Id.
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of real property.18 The principal purpose of the medieval English lease
was to convey land for such agrarian uses as sheep grazing, and consequently little significance was attached to dwellings or buildings on
the land. 19 It was the land itself that was important in landlord-tenant

law.
Since the lease was deemed to be a sale of an interest in land, the
courts have historically applied the principles of real property law
rather than those of contract law to conflicts between lessor and
lessee. 20 Consequently, the doctrine of caveat emptor-let the buyer
beware-long a significant facet of the law of real property, became
ingrained in the lease. 21 While the landlord covenanted that he had the
still treated as personal property. See, e.g., Sheaffer v. Baeringer, 346 Pa. 32, 29 A.2d 697
(1943).
A lease for years is only a chattel, or, as it is called, a chattel real; it is personal
not real estate; it is not subject to the lien of a judgment and has none of the
attributes of real property.
Id. at 34, 29 A.2d at 698. See also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPrRY, supra note 16, § 3.1, at
176; 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 16, at 115-16; 2 R. POWELL, supra note 16,
221 [2], at 185; 3 G. THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 7-8.
221 [1], at 177-78.
18 2 R. POWELL, supra note 16,
The course of events by which, between 1200 and 1500, the lessee became
recognized as the owner of an interest in land protected both against his lessor
and against third persons is a fascinating tale of legal evolution ....
Id. at 177 (footnote omitted).
19 See Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 189, 192 (1968); Indritz, The
Tenants' Rights Movement, 1 NEw MExico L. REv. 1, 41 (1971); Quinn & Phillips,
The Law of Landlord-Tenant:A Critical Evaluation of the Past With Guidelines for the
Future, 38 Fo.DHAM L. REv. 225, 227 (1969).
20 See Michaels v. Brookhester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958).
Historically a lease was viewed as a sale of an interest in land. The concept
of caveat emptor, applicable to such sales, seemed logically pertinent to leases of
land.
Id. at 382, 140 A.2d at 201. See also 3 G. THOMPSON, supra note 16, § 1209, at 87; cf. 6
S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 890, at 587 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1962).

21 It is the established general rule in this state that, upon the letting of a house
or lands, there is no implied warranty or condition that the premises are fit and
suitable for the purpose specified, or for the use to which the lessee proposes to
The rule of caveat emptor governs
devote them, or indeed for any purpose ....
generally.
La Freda v. Woodward, 125 N.J.L. 489, 492-93, 15 A.2d 798, 800 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940).
See also Grimes, supra note 19, at 192; Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need
for Change, 44 DENvER L.J. 387 (1967); cf. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16,
§ 3.45 at 267; 2 R. POWELL, supra note 16, 225 [2], at 230.
The history and development of caveat emptor is based on a theory of bargaining at

arm's length with the ability and opportunity to gain information about the property
involved in the transaction. See generally Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor,
40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931). The doctrine of caveat emptor is directly contrary to the position
taken by the civil law, where it is the seller who must beware. See Comment, BuilderVendor's Implied Warranty of Good Workmanship and Habitability, 1 TEX. TEcH L.
RE". 111, 113-14 n.13 (1969) (quoting from COKE, FrsT INSTITUTE 102 (3d ed. 1633)), which
states:
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power to transfer possession to the tenant and that he would leave the
tenant in quiet enjoyment of the leasehold, 22 there was no implied
covenant or warranty of the fitness of the premises for any particular
purpose. 23 Under the rule of caveat emptor, the prospective tenant was
expected either to inspect the premises and make a determination of
fitness himself or to bargain with the landlord for an express warranty
against defects. 24 Caveat emptor provided the landlord with broad
Note that by the Civil Law every man is bound to warrant the thing that he
selleth or conveyeth, albeit there is no expresse Warranty, but the Common Law
bindeth him not, unlesse therebe a warranty, either in Deed or in Law for Caveat
emptor ....
While caveat emptor originally applied to all transfers of property, it is no longer recognized in the sale of personal property and goods, where extensive warranties of fitness
have been imposed by statute. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315; N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12A:2.314, 2-315 (1962); cf. Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for
Use: Recent Developments, 16 RuTGERts L. Rxv. 493 (1962). Caveat emptor has also been
eroded in the law of real property in the area of new house sales, one of its principal
strongholds. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 91-92, 207 A.2d 314,
326-27 (1965); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex. 1968). See generally Bearman,
Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv.
541 (1961); Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965); Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The
Housing Merchant Did It, 52 COmELL L.Q. 835 (1967). Thus, the leasing of real property
is one of the last vestiges of the ancient maxim of caveat emptor. The doctrine as applied
to landlord-tenant law has also been called "caveat lessee'-let the lessee beware. See,
e.g., Grimes, supra note 19, at 189; Harkrider, supra note 4, at 260.
22 Quinn & Phillips, supra note 19, at 227.
Inherent in the conveyance of a possessory estate for a term was the duty of
the landlord to leave the tenant in possession for the term of the lease without
interference. It was in return for this estate and the continuing right to quietly
possess the land that the tenant covenanted to pay the rent. This inherent duty
of the landlord was imposed by the law through the device of an implied covenant.
Thus, every lease contained by implication, if not expressly, the landlord's
covenant not to oust the tenant from possession of the demised premises or any
part thereof during the term of the lease.
Id. at 229 n.5. The landlord's obligations under this covenant of quiet enjoyment clearly
are not of an affirmative nature but rather negative in character: merely to leave the
tenant in possession.
28 Naumberg v. Young, 44 N.J.L. 331, 344-45 (Sup. Ct. 1882).
Nor will a warranty, such as has been sued on, be implied from the contract
of letting. The general doctrine of the law is, that upon a demise there is no
implied contract that the property is fit for the use for which the lessee requires
it, whether for habitation, occupation or cultivation.
Id. at 344. Accord, La Freda v. Woodward, 125 N.J.L. 489, 492-93, 15 A.2d 798, 800 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1940); Siggins v. McGill, 72 N.J.L. 263, 264, 62 A. 411, 411 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905).
See also 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.45, at 267; 2 R. PowELL, supra
225 [2], at 230.
note 16,
24 Franklin v. Brown, 53 N.Y. Super. 474, 479 (1886), af'd, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E.
126 (1889).
[I]n the absence of any covenant in the lease itself, as to the fitness of the
leased premises for occupation as a dwelling, no covenant of the lessor can be
implied on the subject, and that unless by reason of direct or constructive fraud
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immunity from liability both for the unusability of the property and
for injuries resulting from its defective condition. 25 Moreover, regardless of injury or unsuitability, the tenant was required to pay the rent.
He had what he had bargained for-possession of the land. Under
property law principles, as opposed to those of contract, the covenant
by the tenant to pay rent was generally deemed independent of any
covenant made by the landlord. 26 Despite the criticisms of both jurists
and legal commentators 27 and the exceptions which developed to
ameliorate the harshness of the doctrine's application, 28 caveat emptor
remained fully embedded in the law of landlord and tenant.
or culpable negligence on the part of the lessor, the tenant hires at his peril;
and a rule similar to that of caveat emptor applies, and throws on the lessee the
responsibility of examining as to the existence of defects in the premises and of
providing against their ill effects.
53 N.Y. Super. at 479; cf. Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 63, 253 A.2d 167, 170 (1969). See
generally Grimes, supra note 19, at 193; Comment, Demise of the Traditional Doctrine of
Caveat Emptor, 20 DEPAUL L. Rxv. 955, 971 (1971).
25 See I AMERICAN LAW or PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.45, at 267.
There is no implied covenant or warranty that at the time the term commences
the premises are in a tenantable condition or that they are adapted to the purpose
for which leased. The tenant, then, cannot use such unfitness either as a defense
to an action for rent or as a basis for recovery in tort for damages to person or
property.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
26 See, e.g., Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N.J.L 648, 650-51, 92 A. 392, 393 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1914). Accord, Duncan Development Co. v. Duncan Hardware, 34 N.J. Super. 293,
298, 112 A.2d 274, 277 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 19 N.J. 328, 116 A.2d 829 (1955). See also
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 3.45, at 267; Quinn & Phillips, supra note
19, at 233-35; Comment, Implied Wari'anty of Habitability:An Incipient Trend in the Law
of Landlord-Tenant?,40 FORDHAm L REV. 123, 123-24 (1971); cf. 6 S. WILLISrON, supra note

20, § 890, at 589.
27 See, e.g., Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 325-28 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 935 (1953), wherein the dissent stated:
The key to the decision of the court, relieving both the landlord and the
District of Columbia from liability, lies in its adherence to the rule at common law
that "[a]bsent any statutory or contract duty, the lessor is not responsible for an
injury resulting from a defect which developed during the term." I think that
rule is an anachromism [sic] which has lived on through stare decisis alone rather
than through pragmatic adjustment to "the felt necessities of [our] time." I would
therefore discard it and cast the presumptive burden of liability upon the landlord.
This, I think, is the command of the realities and mores of our day.
202 F.2d at 325 (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). See also B. CARDOzo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 108, 150 (1921); Grimes, supra note 19, at 225; Quinn &

Phillips, supra note 19, at 225; Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal
for Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519, 558 (1966); Skillern, supra note 21, at 397-98.
28 Two exceptions to the general rule of caveat emptor relieved the tenant of
liability for rent because of the defective condition of the premises. The first exception,
developed in Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693, 694 (Ex. 1843), found an implied
warranty of habitability where the landlord leased a furnished house for a short term. The
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While the view of the lease as a sale of an interest in land may have
been appropriate in the rugged agrarian environment in which it developed, the modem lease, especially in the urban residential setting,
more closely resembles a contract for services. 29 The needs of conreasoning behind this exception for furnished dwellings was articulated in Ingalls v.
Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892), wherein the court stated:
Its fitness for immediate use of a particular kind, as indicated by its appointments,
is a far more important element entering into the contract than when there is a
mere lease of real estate. One who lets for a short term a house provided with all
furnishings and appointments for immediate residence may be supposed to contract in reference to a well understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a
habitation. An important part of what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to
enjoy it without delay, and without the expense of preparing it for use. It is very
difficult, and often impossible, for one to determine on inspection whether the
house and its appointments are fit for the use for which they are immediately
wanted, and the doctrine caveat emptor, which is ordinarily applicable to a
lessee of real estate, would often work injustice if applied to cases of this kind.
Id. at 350, 31 N.E. at 286-87. Accord, Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 143-44, 116 A. 26, 27i
(1922). The second exception, also an implied warranty of fitness, arose where the lease
restricted the tenant to a particular use and the agreement was reached before construction of the premises was completed. The rationale was that the tenant did not have an
opportunity to inspect for defects at the time the lease was executed. See, e.g., Woolford
v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 390-91, 75 P.2d 112, 114 (Dist. Ct. App.
1938); Hardman Estate v. McNair, 61 Wash. 74, 76-77, 111 P. 1059, 1061 (1910).
Contrary to the immunity provided under caveat emptor, tort liability has been based
upon the implied warranty of habitability in a furnished dwelling. See Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 250-51, 2 P.2d 518, 520 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Horton v. Marston,
352 Mass. 322, 325-26, 225 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1967); Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537,
539-40, 70 N.E.2d 418, 420 (1946); Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 757, 39 N.E.2d 644,
646 (1942).
While liability for personal injuries under the implied warranty of habitability is
clearly a minority view, tort liability has broken through the caveat emptor barrier on
several theories which have been more widely accepted. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 63, at 400-12 (4th ed. 1971); Grimes, supra note 19, at 209-24;
Harkrider (pts. 1 & 2), supra note 4, at 260, 383. The liability of a landlord to his tenant
for injury caused by the condition of the leased premises is summarized in 2 R. POWriL,
234 [2], at 332-33 as follows:
supra note 16,
(1) In cases of fraudulent concealment of a dangerous condition existing at
the time of leasing;
(2) In cases based upon negligence as to parts of the premises remaining
under the lessor's control;
(3) Incidents involving negligence in the making of repairs;
(4) Situations involving the lessor's failure to perform his agreement to repair;
(5) Instances involving the lessor's failure to discharge his statutorily imposed
duty to repair ....
(footnotes omitted).
29 Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract (Damages for
Anticipatory Breach and Interdependency of Covenants), 16 TEXAS L. R-v. 47 (1937).
While the English tenant was primarily interested in the use of the land, from
which the rent was said to "issue," the modern urban lessee is most vitally interested in the buildings thereon. The lease as a grant of an "estate in land" has
given way to the lease as a business contract wherein both parties make numerous
covenants, some of which may be classed as essential. In addition to the usual covenants of seisin and quiet enjoyment, the lessor often promises to keep the premises
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temporary urban society called out for a reconsideration of the fundamental character of the lease. Only in the last fifteen years, however,
have the courts begun to react to these pressures.
One of the first courts to respond to the manifest need for reconsideration of the nature of the lease was the Wisconsin supreme court
in deciding Pines v. Perssion30 The plaintiffs in Pines, four university
students, leased a furnished home from the defendant landlord for
residential use during the academic year. Prior to the beginning of the
lease term, three of the plaintiffs inspected the premises and found
it to be in a "filthy condition." 3' The plaintiffs claimed that at the
time of the inspection the defendant represented that he would clean
and repair the premises before the students planned to take possession the following fall. When the plaintiffs arrived at the premises to
begin the lease term, however, the house was still filthy and unsuited for
student occupancy. 32 Upon the advice of counsel, the plaintiffs had the
premises inspected by the municipal building department, and the
inspection revealed several violations of the building code. 33 After attempting to clean the premises themselves, the plaintiffs brought an
action against the lessor to recover their security deposit and the reasonable value of their services. On appeal, the Wisconsin court held for
the plaintiffs by enlarging the recognized exception to the doctrine of
caveat emptor which implied a warranty of habitability when the subject of the lease was a furnished house leased for a short term.8 4 After
noting that prior courts had indicated that the furnished house exception to the general no warranty theory was " 'a warranty to be extended
rather than restricted,' ,,35 the court considered current public policy as
reflected in building and housing codes, and reasoned that
[t]o follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in
leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current
legislative policy concerning housing standards. The need and
social desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of
in repair and in tenantable condition, to furnish heat, hot water, elevator service,
et cetera; so that it cannot always be said that the lessor has substantially performed,' merely by executing the lease and allowing the lessee to take possession
of the premises. In keeping with this profound change in the nature of the lease,
so also must its legal effects be altered.
Id. at 47-48 (footnotes omitted). See also 2 R. POWELL, supra note 16,
221 [1], at 178-79.
30 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
31 Id. at 591, 111 N.W.2d at 410.
32 Id. at 591-92, 111 N.W.2d at 411.
33 Id. at 592-93, 111 N.W.2d at 411.
34 See note 28 supra.
35 14 Wis. 2d at 595, 111 N.W.2d at 412 (quoting from Collins v. Hopkins, 2 K.B.
617 (1923)) (emphasis by the court).
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rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that
obnoxious legal clich6, caveat emptor.86
Because of the numerous housing code violations, 37 the court found "a
failure of consideration3 8 on the part of the landlord, thus relieving the
tenant of any liability for rent under the lease. The landlord's implied
warranty of habitability and the tenant's covenant to pay rent were
deemed mutually dependent.8 9 While Pines may be viewed as only an

expansion of the furnished house exception to caveat emptor,40 its
recognition of contemporary social needs in resolving landlord-tenant
disputes provided a useful point of departure for other courts.
Although courts generally continued to analyze the landlord-tenant

relationship in terms of real property principles, an increasing sensitivity to social and economic realities induced some courts to recognize
contract theories as possible, alternatives for sustaining tenants' insistence upon habitable premises. In Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,41 for
example, the New Jersey supreme court, while deciding the case on the
42
basis of the trial court's finding of a constructive eviction of the tenant,
38 14 Wis. 2d at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
87 Among the housing code violations found by the city inspector were "inadequate
electrical wiring, kitchen sink and toilet in disrepair, furnace in disrepair, handrail on
stairs in disrepair, screens on windows and doors lacking." Id. at 593, 111 N.W.2d at 411.
8 Id. at 597, 111 N.W.2d at 413. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 274, comment a at 400
(1932) defines failure of consideration as
a generic expression covering every case where an exchange of values is to be
made and the exchange does not take place, either because of the fault of a party
or without his fault.
See also I A. CORBIN, CORaIN ON CONTRACrS § 133, at 572 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note
20, § 119A, at 490.
89 14 Wis. 2d at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413. Mutuality of covenants is a dear departure
from traditional property rules where all covenants were deemed independent. See note 26
supra and accompanying text.
40 The Wisconsin court in implying the warranty of habitability extended the definition of "short term" to include a one year lease. While the duration of a "short
term" had not been defined in any case relied upon by the Pines court, none had applied
the warranty to a lease of that length. Although the court began its analysis with the
exception to caveat emptor, there is no explicit holding that limits the warranty to furnish
dwellings rented for a year or less. On the contrary, the social policies recognized by the
court suggest a basis for broad application of the implied warranty of habitability.
41 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
42 Id. at 462-63, 251 A.2d at 278. The doctrine of "constructive eviction" relieves the
tenant of liability for rent because he has "constructively" been deprived of possessionthe quid pro quo for his payment of rent.
Under this rule any act or omission of the landlord or of anyone who acts under
authority or legal right from the landlord, or of someone having superior title to
that of the landlord, which renders the premises substantially unsuitable for the
purpose for which they are leased, or which seriously interferes with the beneficial
enjoyment of the. premises, is a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and
constitutes a constructive eviction of the tenant.
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recognized that the landlord's failure to provide suitable premises could
43
also be characterized as a failure of consideration.
The defendant in Reste Realty leased the ground floor of a commercial building for office use,44 but a concealed defect in a driveway
which ran alongside the building caused continual flooding of the
defendant's offices. 45 Although the landlord's agent took steps to remove
the water on numerous occasions, the "crowning blow" 46 occurred when
five inches of water flooded the premises just before an important sales
meeting. 47 When the defendant vacated the premises, the landlord sued
to recover rent for the balance of the lease term. In sustaining the
tenant's defense that the constant flooding amounted to a constructive
eviction, 48 the court stated that the tenant's right to vacate leased
premises could also be expressed incontract terms:
In our view, therefore, at the present time whenever a tenant's
right to vacate leased premises comes into existence because he is
deprived of their beneficial enjoyment and use on account of acts
chargeable to the landlord, it is immaterial whether the right is
expressed in terms of breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment,
or material failure of consideration, 49
or material breach of an implied warranty against latent defects.

Thus, in addition to recognizing a limited warranty of habitability50
which is not dependent upon existing exceptions to the usual caveat
emptor approach, the New Jersey court suggested that the contemporary lease has other contractual features.
Building upon the foundation established in Reste Realty, other
Id. at 457, 251 A.2d at 274. See generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 16,
§ 3.51, at 280-82; 2 R. PowmL, supra note 16,
225 [3], at 232.5-40; 6 S. WILLIStON, Supra
note 20, § 892, at 646-60.
48 53 N.J. at 460-61, 251 A.2d at 276-77. See note 38 supra.
44 53 N.J. at 448, 251 A.2d at 270.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 450, 251 A.2d at 271. The tenant's original landlord had made good faith

attempts to remove the water flooding the basement when notified. However, he died and
complaints to the subsequent lessor were ignored. The defendant tenant and her personnel
attempted to remove the water. On some occasions the flooding was so bad that the tenant
moved her business to a nearby inn. Id. at 448-50, 251 A.2d at 270-71.
47 Id. at 450, 251 A.2d at 271.
48 Id. at 462-63, 251 A.2d at 278.
49 Id. at 461, 251 A.2d at 276-77.
50 The court observed that
present day demands of fair treatment for -tenants with respect to latent defects
remediable by the landlord, either within the demised premises or outside the
demised premises, require imposition on him of an implied warranty against such
defects.... Such warranty might be described as a limited warranty of habitability.
Id. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273 (citations omitted).
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courts have extended the "limited" theory of implied warranties of
habitability and have discarded the constructive eviction doctrine as a
judicial fiction arising out of the "wooden rules of property law."51
In Lemle v. Breeden," the plaintiff sued the landlord to recover a
security deposit and rental payments because of the rat-infested condition of a residential dwelling. After observing that warranties of habit53
ability and constructive eviction were "two very distinct doctrines,"
the Hawaii court examined the Reste Realty decision and concluded
that the application of an implied warranty of habitability
affirms the fact that a lease is, in essence, a sale as well as a transfer
of an estate in land and is, more importantly, a contractual relationship. From that contractual relationship an implied warranty
of habitability and fitness
for the purposes intended is a just and
54
necessary implication.
By rejecting the theory of constructive eviction in favor of "the more
flexible concept of implied warranty of habitability," 55 the Lemle court
obviated the often risky requirement 6 that the aggrieved tenant
57
abandon the premises in favor of less drastic contract remedies.
The first major case to deal with the implied warranty concept in
an urban multiple-dwelling context was Javins v. First National Realty
Corp. 58 Javins was an action for possession instituted by the landlord on
the ground that the tenants had defaulted in rent payments. The
tenants admitted the default but offered to prove approximately 1,500
violations of the District of Columbia Housing Regulations by way of
set-off. 59 Holding that a warranty of habitability, measured by the
51 Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969).
52

Id.

Id. at 429, 462 P.2d at 472.
Id. at 433, 462 P.2d at 474 (footnote omitted). See also Brown v. Southall Realty
Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), in which the court characterized a lease with
substantial housing violations at the inception of the term as an illegal contract. Id. at
836-57.
55 51 Hawaii at 434, 462 P.2d at 475.
56 Id. at 434-35, 462 P.2d at 475. The remedy of constructive eviction has serious drawbacks from a tenant's point of view.
If the conduct of a landlord is later found by a court not to have justified the
tenant in vacating the premises, he will remain liable for unpaid rent. Furthermore he may be unable to find other quarters that he can afford and that he
wishes to rent and in any event he will be saddled with the not inconsiderable
expenses of moving.
Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 466, 508 A.2d 17, 20 (1973).
57 51 Hawaii at 456, 462 P.2d at 475. Under the implied warranty of habitability
the tenant could remain in possession of the premises and have a choice of "the basic
contract remedies of damages, reformation, and rescission." Id.
58 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
59 428 F.2d at 1075.
53

54
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standards set forth in the housing code regulations, was implied in a
lease,60 the court stated that "leases of urban dwelling units should be
interpreted and construed like any other contract."' 61 By analogizing the
plight of the urban tenant to an injured plaintiff in a products liability
context,62 and by recognizing the unequal bargaining power inherent
in the modern landlord-tenant relationship, 63 the court found strong
public policy reasons for imposing the warranty.
New Jersey extended the implied warranty of habitability en64
gendered by Reste Realty to residential dwellings in Mariniv. Ireland.
In Marini,an action for dispossess, the tenant of a two-family house was
allowed to offset the cost she incurred in repairing a leaking toilet
against the rent due under the lease. Recognizing both the trend toward
Id. at 1082.
We therefore hold that the Housing Regulations imply a warranty of habitability, measured by the standards which they set out, into leases of all housing
that they cover.
60

Id.
61 Id. at 1075 (footnote omitted).
62 Id. at 1075-76, 1079. The court compared the landlord and the tenant to the seller
and the buyer of goods and services in an industrialized society.
The landlord sells housing as a commercial businessman and has much greater
opportunity, incentive and capacity to inspect and maintain the condition of his
building. Moreover, the tenant must rely upon the skill and bona fides of his landlord at least as much as a car buyer must rely upon the car manufacturer. In
dealing with major problems, such as heating, plumbing, electrical or structural
defects, the tenant's position corresponds precisely with "the ordinary consumer
who cannot be expected to have the knowledge or capacity or even the opportunity to make adequate inspection of mechanical instrumentalities, like automobiles, and to decide for himself whether they are reasonably fit for the designed
purpose."
Id. at 1079 (quoting from Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 375, 161 A.2d
69, 78 (1960)) (footnote omitted).
63 Id. at 1079.
Tenants have very little leverage to enforce demands for better housing. Various
impediments to competition in the rental housing market, such as racial and class
discrimination and standardized form leases: mean that landlords place tenants in
a take it or leave it situation. The increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing
further increases the landlord's bargaining power and escalates the need for maintaining and improving the existing stock.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The average contemporary tenant, unlike the feudal English lessee,
can neither adequately inspect the premises nor secure an express warranty of fitness from
his landlord. Modern social conditions require the imposition of the warranty of habitability. This warranty applies both to conditions existing at the inception of the lease
and to those arising during the term. Id. See generally Daniels, Judicial and Legislative
Remedies for Substandard Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in the District of
Columbia, 59 GEo. L.J. 909 (1971). See also Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants' Private
Law Rights: Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases,
56 CORNELL L. REv. 489 (1971); Note, D.C. Housing Regulations, Article 290, Section 2902:
Construed pursuant to Brown v. Southall Realty Co. and Javins v. First National Realty
Corp.-A New Day for the Urban Tenant?, 16 How. L.J. 366 (1971).
64 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
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construing leases along contract guidelines and the growing rejection of
the theory that a landlord has no duty to make repairs, 65 the court
stated:
In a modern setting, the landlord should, in residential letting, be
held to an implied covenant against latent defects, which is another manner of saying, habitability and livability fitness ....
It
is a mere matter of semantics whether we designate this covenant
one "to repair" or "of habitability and livability fitness." 60
The court in Marini characterized the covenant of habitability and the
covenant to pay rent as "dependent or independent according to the
intention of the parties and the good sense of the case."6 7 The tenant
was allowed the self-help remedy of repair-and-deduct in addition to the
previously recognized remedy of constructive eviction.68 The court
emphasized, however, that prior to availing himself of self-help, a tenant
was required to give "timely and adequate notice to the landlord of the
faulty condition in order to accord him the opportunity to make the
necessary replacement or repair." 6
With the recent decision of Berzito v. Gambino,7o the New Jersey
supreme court expanded the rationale of Marini by holding that the
covenant to pay rent and the covenant of habitability must be viewed as
mutually dependent.7 1 Unlike either Reste Realty or Marini, the tenant
72
in Berzito did not vacate the premises alleging constructive eviction,
nor did she make repairs and attempt to offset the cost against her rent
obligation.7 3 Rather, she chose to seek recovery for the difference between the rent actually paid and the reasonable rental Value of the
"uninhabitable" premises.74 In recognizing the mutuality of the landlord's duty to maintain the premises in a livable condition and the
tenant's corresponding duty to pay rent, the court clarified a statement
Id. at 141-43, 265 A.2d at 532-33.,
66 Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534. The court further stated that this covenant was actually
a covenant that at the inception of the lease, there are no latent defects in
facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential purposes because of faulty
original construction or deterioration from age or normal usage. And further it is
a covenant that these facilities will remain in usable condition during the entire
term of the lease. In performance of this covenant the landlord is required to
maintain those facilities in a condition which renders the property livable.
65

Id.
67 Id. at 145, 265 A.2d at 534.

68 Id. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
69 lid.
70 63 N.J. 460, 808 A.2d 17 (1973).
71 Id. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21.
72 Id. at 467, 308 A.2d at 20.
73 Id.

74 Id. at 464, 308 A.2d at 19.
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in Marini that the aggrieved tenant had only the remedies of making
the necessary repairs himself or of quitting the premises under a constructive eviction. 5 Under the Berzito formula, therefore, the tenant
had a new remedy, since he could initiate
an action against his landlord to recover either part or all of a
deposit paid upon the execution and delivery of the lease or part
or all of the rent thereafter paid during the term, where he alleges
that the lessor has broken76 his covenant to maintain the premises
in a habitable condition.
While it was unlikely that the landlord in Dwyer could be held
liable under negligence principles since the defective condition was
77
latent and he had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of it,
both the plaintiff and the trial court maintained that the warranty of
habitability enunciated in the Marini case gave rise to a continuing
duty to repairi and maintain the premises free from latent defects at all
times during the lease term.7 8 Failure to comply with this duty, it was
75 Id. at 468-69, 308 A.2d at 21. See Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 147, 265 A.2d 526,
535 (1970), where the court had stated that "[t]he tenant has only the alternative remedies
of making the repairs or removing from the premises upon such a constructive eviction."
76 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 22. Accordingly, the tenant was able to remain in the
premises at a reduced rent. Id. The remedy of rent abatement had previously been fashioned
for an urban tenant faced with a housing shortage and financially unable to make repairs
in Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 480, 484, 488, 268 A.2d 556, 558,
560, 562 (Essex County Dist. Ct. 1970). The implied warranty of habitability and the remedy
of rent abatement were extended to situations involving patent as well as latent defects
in Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 340, 343, 291 A.2d 580, 581, 583 (App. Div.
1972), discussed in Note, Abatement of Rent Allowed for Breach of the Implied Warranty
of Habitability in a Patent Defect Situation, 4 SrTON HALL L. REV. 714 (1973).
New Jersey now has a statute authorizing the withholding of rent because of uninhabitability. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-85 et seq. (Supp. 1973-74). N.J. SrAT. ANN. § 2A:42-88
provides in pertinent part:
The public officer or any tenant occupying a dwelling may maintain a proceeding as provided in this act, upon the ground that there exists in such dwellings
or in housing space thereof a lack of heat or of running water or of light or of
electricity or of adequate sewage disposal facilities, or any other condition or conditions in substantial violation of the standards of fitness for human habitation
established under the State or local housing or health codes or regulations or any
other condition dangerous to life, health or safety.
If the court finds such conditions, the statute authorizes the payment of rents into the
court. The court may then use those funds to remedy the condition or conditions. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-92,
77 123 N.J. Super. at 53, 301 A.2d at 465. See notes 4 & 28 supra for the basis of a
landlord's liability in negligence.
78 123 N.J. Super. at 51, 301 A.2d at 464. Plaintiff's Petition and Appendix for Certification at 5 states:
The covenant as set forth in Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130 (1970), states that
the facilities will remain in usable condition during the entire term of the lease.
In performance of this covenant the landlord is required to maintain these facilities
in a condition which renders the property livable. it was this breach of duty by
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argued, would give rise to tort liability.7 9 The appellate division, however, rejected this view of the Marini doctrine.8 0 Reviewing the circumstances under which Marini had been decided and the cases in which it
had been followed, the court concluded that Marini only provided "a
just and practical approach to the protection of the rights of tenants
vis-a-vis landlords in the sphere of eviction and its dire social consequences." 81 The court then went on to hold:
The development of this new "bill of rights" for tenants, however, does not necessarily lead to the imposition of liability in tort
on a landlord bottomed upon a concept of a continuing warranty of
habitability. We are of the opinion that the language of the Supreme Court in the context of the narrow issue in Marini was not
intended to overturn existing principles of law applicable to tort
actions for personal injuries by tenants versus landlords.8 2
While the Dwyer court limited the implied warranty of habitability to the context of rent abatement and eviction, 8 tort liability
the landlord-appellant of an implied covenant against latent defects that the facilities remain in usable condition during the entire term of the lease, which made
the landlord-appellant liable in damages to the tenant-petitioner.
79 Liability in tort for breach of an express covenant to repair was found in Michaels
v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958):
We are satisfied that a landlord's covenant to repair gives rise to a duty in tort
with liability to the tenant for damages consequential to a negligent failure to
perform, and that such liability is not dependent upon nor limited by the tensile
strength of the concept of reserved control.
Id. at 385, 140 A.2d at 202. The landlord in Michaels was found to be negligent in not
making repairs when he had knowledge of the need for repairs and an opportunity to
make them. Id. If the warranty of habitability had been construed as a "covenant to
repair" giving rise to tort liability, the court still might have held against the plaintiff
on the ground that while there was a duty to repair and keep the premises in repair,
since there was no knowledge or notice of the defect, there was no negligence. 123 N.J.
Super. at 52, 301 A.2d at 468. Such an interpretation of the implied warranty of habitability would merely judicially extend to all residential dwellings what the legislature had
accomplished with remedial housing statutes applicable to buildings where three or more
families reside. See Law of March 25, 1904, ch. 61, § 1-211, [1904] N.J. Laws 96-149, repealed
and superseded by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:13A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973-74). Law of March 25,
1904, ch. 61, § 144, [1904] N.J. Laws 131 provides in pertinent part:
Every tenement-house hereafter erected or now existing and all the parts
thereof, shall be placed and maintained in good repair ....
This statute has been liberally construed and negligent failure to keep "all the parts"
in good condition creates tort liability. See, e.g., Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., supra at
386-87, 140 A.2d at 203; Altomare v. Cesaro, 70 N.J. Super. 54, 58, 174 A.2d 754, 756 (App.
Div. 1961).
80 123 N.J. Super. at 55, 301 A.2d at 466.
81 Id. at 54, 301 A.2d at 466.
82 Id. at 54-55, 301 A.2d at 466.
83 But see Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 250-51, 2 P.2d 518, 520 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1931); Horton v. Marston, 352 Mass. 322, 325-26, 225 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1967); Ackarey
v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 539-40, 70 N.E.2d 418, 420 (1946); Hacker v. Nitschke, 310
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arising out of an implied warranty is not a new concept. The warranty,
whereby the seller guarantees the quality and safe condition of his own
goods, has been termed "a curious hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse
of tort and contract, unique in the law."8 4 Although liability under a
warranty was originally founded in tort, 5 by the end of the eighteenth
century the warranty came to be viewed as an incident of the sales contract, whether it was express or implied. 6 While the remedy was in the
form of a contract action, the obligation was distinctly tortious, since it
was imposed upon the seller regardless of voluntary assent or agreement.87
Because of its contractual character, warranty liability was traditionally limited to the parties to the contract of sale. 88 However, the

public interest in consumer protection ultimately led to the development of products liability laws9 which largely eliminated the privity
defense. The landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.90
seized upon the representation of safety in the warranty concept and expanded it beyond the parties to the sales contract. The warranty of the
defendant automobile manufacturer had previously reached only its
immediate buyer, the dealer. However, the Henningsen court extended
the implied warranty of fitness to the ultimate purchaser, members of
his family, and other persons using the automobile, despite the lack of
privity of contract. 91 Since the ultimate consumer had "neither the
Mass. 754, 757, 39 N.E.2d 644, 646 (1942); see also Quinn & Phillips, supra note 19, at
255-56; Comment, Housing Codes and a Tort of Slumlordism, 8 HourON L. REv. 522,
533-36 (1970); Comment, Tenant Remedies-The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 16 ViLL. L. REV. 710, 725 (1971); Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the
Landlord-Lessor, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 458, 477 (1970).
84 W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 95, at 634 (footnote omitted).
85 1 S. WILLIsroN, Tn LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 195, at 501 (1948); Ames,
History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1888).
86 W. PROSSa, supra note 28, § 95, at 634-35; 1 S. WILLIsroN, supra note 85, at 502.
87 W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 95, at 635.
Tort actions are created to protect the interest in freedom from various kinds of
harm. The duties of conduct which give rise to them are imposed by the law, and
are based primarily upon social policy, and not necessarily upon the will or intention of the parties.
Id. § 92, at 613.
88 Id. § 93, at 622-23. The leading case precluding recovery by persons not in "privity"
of contract is Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (Ex. 1842).
89 Products liability law may be traced to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), in which the court allowed recovery in negligence, notwithstanding the lack of privity on the ground that the manufacturer's duty of care extended
to all persons who might foreseeably use the product. Id. at 389-93, 111 N.E. at 1051-54.
See generally Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
90 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
91 Id. at 384, 414-15, 161 A.2d at 84, 100.
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opportunity nor the capacity to inspect or to determine the fitness of
an automobile for use" 92 and faced "gross inequality of bargaining
position,"9' 3 the Henningsen court concluded that modern conditions
4
required the imposition of the implied warranty against latent defects.
While the warranty theory satisfied many of the policy considerations of consumer protection, the contract overtones of the warranty
concept were troublesome and were often criticized as creating confusion in an area where the liability was clearly founded in tort. 5 Consequently, the doctrine of strict liability in tort evolved, 96 and it became clear that under certain circumstances liability would he imposed
upon manufacturers and sellers of defective products apart from any
contractual relations between the parties. The theory of strict liability
in tort was adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Santor v.
A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,97 an action by the purchaser of a defective
carpet to recover the purchase price from the manufacturer.98 Recognition that liability was founded on a tort theory eliminated both the
prior contract defense of privity and requirements of notice of defect. 99
Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 83-84.
Id. at 391, 161 A.2d at 87.
94 Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 83.
95 See Prosser, supra note 89, at 1134.
96 The first case to apply the concept of strict liability in tort was Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have
a defect that causes injury to a human being.
Id. The California supreme court anticipated the RmSATEmENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402 A
(1965) which provides for strict liability. Section 402 A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
97 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965).
98 Id. at 57, 207 A.2d at 307.
99 Id. at 63, 67-68, 207 A.2d at 310, 313.
The New Jersey courts have found no substantial difference between the implied
warranty of fitness and strict liability in tort. See id. at 63-64, 207 A.2d at 311; Newmafk
v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 595, 258 A.2d 697, 702 (1969). Under both theories the
defendant is strictly liable in the sense that no negligence or deviation from a standard
of reasonable care need be shown. See Santor, supra at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 313; Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 452, 212 A.2d 769, 779 (1965). Since
the purpose of this liability is
92
93
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Although in New Jersey strict liability in tort has been applied to
manufacturers and sellers of personal property, 10 0 to sellers of real
property, 1°1 and to lessors of personal property, 0 2 the Dwyer court saw
no basis for extending the doctrine to lessors of real property. 103 In
to insure that the cost of injuries or damage . . . resulting from defective products, is borne by the makers of the products who put them in the channels of
trade, rather than by the injured or damaged persons who ordinarily are powerless
to protect themselves.
Santor, supra at 65, 207 A.2d at 312. This statement of purpose has led to the characterization of the doctrine of strict liability in tort as enterprise liability. Cintrone, supra at
450, 212 A.2d at 778; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325
(1965) (quoting from Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 307,
312 (1965)). One of the subsisting rationales of enterprise liability is risk distribution,
that is, that the seller can bear the loss better than the injured buyer because the seller's
economic position allows him to pass along the cost of the loss as an incident of the
enterprise's doing business. See Schipper, supra at 91, 207 A.2d at 326. An in-depth examination of the theoretical basis for risk distribution can be found in Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) and Morris,
Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE
L.J. 554 (1961).
100 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965); cf.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 84 (1960).
101 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965).
[Tihere are no meaningful distinctions between Levitt's mass production and sale
of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles and . . . the pertinent
overriding policy considerations are the same.
Id.
102 45 N.J. 434, 450, 212 A.2d 769, 777 (1965).
By means of a bailment parties can often reach the same business ends that can be
achieved by selling and buying. The goods come to the user for the time being
and he benefits by their use and enjoyment without the burdens of becoming
and remaining the owner. The owner-essor benefits by receiving the rent for the
temporary use.
Id. at 447, 212 A.2d at 776.
103 123 N.J. Super. at 55, 301 A.2d at 466-67. The argument that strict liability in tort
should be applied to landlords was previously presented to two New Jersey courts which
found for the plaintiff on other grounds. In Ellis v. Caprice, 96 N.J. Super. 539, 556, 233
A.2d 654, 663 (App. Div. 1967), the court held the doctrine could not be applied because it
had not been pleaded in the complaint or set up as an issue in the pre-trial order.
Aside from this, we are not persuaded that the facts of this case [a six year old
child playing with matches in a building with inadequate fire escapes] bring it
within the ambit of the Cintrone-Schipperrationale.
Id. In Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 81-82, 234 A.2d 415, 418
(App. Div. 1967), the court held strict liability inapplicable because the lease was an "isolated transaction." Apparently the defendant was not in the leasing business. The implied
representation of safety and the risk distribution rationales that provide the basis for
strict enterprise liability are lacking where the seller is not in the business of selling that
product. See R.STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment f (1965); cf. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-314 (1962), applying only to "merchants"
defined in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-104 (1962) as
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved ....
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declining to apply the theory of strict liability in tort, the court held
that
[t]he underlying reasons for the enforcement of strict liability
against the manufacturer, seller or lessor of products .or the mass
apply to the ordinary landlord
builder-vendor of homes do not
104
of a multiple family dwelling.
The court found no mass production or mass marketing features in the
type of landlord-tenant situation which it confronted in Dwyer. The
court reasoned that a landlord is not the "manufacturer" of a product
with a defect which could have been prevented by greater care in the
manufacture or assembly. In the court's view, the landlord does not
have the expertise to know and correct defective conditions and, therefore, should not be liable without proof of fault. 0 5 Because an apartment is usually constructed by numerous people and subject to
deterioration from many causes, the Dwyer court found no analogy
between a multiple dwelling and a product which the consumer could
reasonably expect to leave the control of the manufacturer with an
implied representation of safety: 0 6
The tenant may expect that at the time of the letting there
are no hidden dangerous defects known to the landlord and of
which the tenant has not been warned. But he does not expect
that all will be perfect in his apartment for all the years of his
occupancy with the result that his landlord will be strictly liable
for all consequences of any deficiency regardless of fault. He expects only that in the event anything goes wrong with the accommodations or the equipment therein, the landlord will repair
it when he knows or should lnow of its existence; and that if
injury results liability will attach. 107
In declining to extend the application of strict liability in tort to
104 123 N.J. Super. at 55, 301 A.2d at 467.

105 Id. But see Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 55 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 272
(1969), wherein the court stated:
It has come to be recognized that ordinarily the lessee does not have as much
knowledge of the condition of the premises as the lessor. Building code requirements and violations are known or made known to the lessor, not the lessee. He is
in a better position to know of latent defects, structural and otherwise, in a building which might go unnoticed by a lessee who rarely has sufficient knowledge or expertise to see or to discover them. A prospective lessee, such as a small businessman, cannot be expected to know if the plumbing or wiring systems are adequate
or conform to local codes. Nor should he be expected to hire experts to advise him.
Ordinarily all this information should be considered readily available to the
lessor who in turn can inform the prospective lessee.
Id.
106 123 N.J. Super. at 55-56, 301 A.2d at 467.
107 Id. at 56, 301 A.2d at 467.
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the landlord-tenant context, the Dwyer court took the position that a
tenant's remedy for personal injuries resulting from defective conditions should continue to be founded only on negligence principles. The
court reasoned that an extension of strict liability would place too great
a burden upon the landlord since it would subject him to liability "for
every injury claim resulting from any untoward condition in every
1 08
cranny of the building, whether it is reasonably foreseeable or not."
Since the landlord could not foresee, prevent or discover latent defects,
the Dwyer court found the application of strict liability in tort to be
without justice or reason. 10 9

The New Jersey courts, in resolving Dwyer, have apparently
slowed their advancement of the rights of tenants and consumers. The
landlord's implied warranty of habitability, unlike most other warranties which provide a basis for tort liability, has apparently become
a word of art. By limiting the landlord's warranty to the context of rent
abatement and eviction, the court has robbed the concept of its vitality
and potential for expansion.
Through its interpretation and application of the doctrine of strict
liability in tort, New Jersey has, in the past, been in the forefront of the
movement toward judicial protection of consumers injured by defective
products. New Jersey has not limited the doctrine of strict liability in
tort to the sales of products, but has expanded its application to reach
sales of realty, 110 leases of personal property,"' and performance of services. 1 2 The Dwyer decision is to be questioned both for its rejection of
tort liability under the warranty of habitability theory and its failure
to extend strict liability in tort to the lessor of residential premises.
The Dwyer opinion is especially unsatisfactory in grounding its
rejection of strict liability on the purported inapplicability of products
108 Id.
109 Id. The rejection of strict liability in tort seems to rest upon the premise that the
defendant in Dwyer was an "ordinary landlord of a multiple family dwelling." Id. at 55,
301 A.2d at 467. The opinion does not define or explain the parameters of a landlord's
characterization as "ordinary." However, it would seem a legitimate inference that presented with an "extraordinary" landlord, strict liability would be imposed. Such a landlord might be similar to the builder-vendor in Schipper in whose mass construction and
sales of homes the court found an analogy to the manufacture and distribution of automobiles. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965). One attribute that the "extraordinary" landlord must evidently demonstrate, however, is that he
is in fact "in the business of selling" living space through the device of the residential
lease. Consequently, there would be a firm basis for reliance upon an implied representation of skill and safety. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment 1 (1965).
See also notes 99 & 103 supra.
110 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
111 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
112 Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
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liability principles. In direct contradiction, many other courts and
legal commentators have found a close analogy between the situation
of the consumer and the residential tenant. 113 Much of the reasoning
invoked by the courts in developing the landlord's implied warranty of
habitability has been based upon products liability precedents. 114 These
cases recognize not only the inability of the consumer/tenant to inspect
the premises for fitness and the greater skill of the seller/landlord, but
also the inequality of bargaining power as well. Moreover, the frequent
use of adhesive lease "agreements," and the greater ability of the seller/
landlord to bear and distribute losses arising out of personal injuries
suffered by consumer/tenants, both militate toward expanding rather
than limiting the landlord's liability in the current housing market.
There may be unarticulated reasons for the court's refusal to
extend the landlord's tort liability. Burdens of repair and maintenance
are already imposed on landlords through the application of the warranty of habitability to the payment of rent. Further burdens in the
form of personal injury judgments may cause landlords to abandon
their properties as unprofitable. Moreover, the payment of tort judgments or liability insurance premiums will increase the expenses of the
landlord. These expenses would be passed on to the tenants in general
in the form of higher rent, thus arguably depriving many people of the
opportunity for adequate housing. 115
113 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 432, 462 P.2d 470, 473-74 (1969);
Grimes, supra note 19, at 210; Quinn & Phillips, supra note 19, at 254; Comment,
Demise of the Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, supra note 24, at 982-83; Comment,
Housing Codes and a Tort of Slumlordism, supra note 83, at 533-37; Note, Landlord v.
Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability and Repair Problem, 22 CASE W. Ras. L. REv.
739, 772-73 (1971); Note, supra note 83, at 479-82; Note, The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor
as applied to Both the Leasing and Sale of Real Property: The Need for Reappraisal and

Reform, 2

RUTGERS-CAMDEN

L.J. 120, 137-39 (1970).

See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 432, 462 P.2d 470, 473-74 (1969;
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 453-54, 251 A.2d 268, 272-73 (1969); Academy
Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 483-84, 268 A.2d 556, 560 (Essex County Dist.
Ct. 1970).
115 See Grimes, supra note 19, at 225-26; Comment, Demise of the Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, supra note 24, at 982; Note, Emerging Landlord Liability:
A Judicial Reevaluation of Tenant Remedies, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 387, 400-01 (1971);
Note, The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor as Applied to Both the Leasing and Sale of
Real Property: The Need for Reappraisal and Reform, supra note 113, at 136. However,
this trading off of compensation of the injured tenant in favor of protection of the private
landlord's continued participation in the housing market through profit incentives may
be based on a fallacious assumption. Imposition of strict liability in tort upon manufacturers of defective consumer goods has apparently not driven great numbers of
producers out of business. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 91-92, 207
114
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NOTES

Despite the advances made in the recognition of tenants' rights in
recent years, the court's resolution of Dwyer shows the continued
vitality of the dubious maxim of caveat emptor. This "obnoxious legal
clichI a16 has no place in a contractual relationship for the provision of
housing services, particularly in urban areas which suffer from chronic
housing shortages. Legislation implying a warranty of habitability and
providing tort liability, based on civil law models,11 7 might be an alternative solution to this recurring problem. In this way, both landlord
A.2d 314, 326 (1965); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299, 311, 296 A.2d 688,
674-75 (L. Div. 1972), appeal docketed, Nos. A 1150-72, A 1153-72, App. Div., Jan. 9, 1973,
discussed in Note, New Jersey Court Applies Theory of Strict Tort Liability to Hospitals
and Blood Banks for Transfusion-Related Hepatitis, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 730 (1973).
But see G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT (1973). This empirical
study sought the causes of abandonment of slum housing in the city of Newark by landlords:
Why then is residential abandonment taking place? In a limited economic
sense it is simply a reflection of a market reality wherein revenues do not equal
or exceed costs. There is a limited level of rent available to a landlord within
the core [city], yet at the same time he is faced by uncontrollable increases in
operating costs: taxes, repairs, insurance costs, security of repair, and collection
personnel, all combined to make immediate yields precarious.
Id. at xxviii. The interviewed landlords named the cost and unavailability of fire and
accident insurance for their properties as one of their major operating problems. Id. at
302. Unable to make a profit or sell their property, the landlord simply abandons the
building. Id. at xxviv.
While the Dwyer court asserted that "the policy considerations underlying the adoption
of strict liability .. .are non-existent in the landlord-tenant relationship," 123 N.J. Super.
at 56, 301 A.2d at 467, it seems more accurate to state that the countervailing public
policy favoring the continued presence of the private landlord precludes the imposition
of strict tort liability. However, while the profit of a core city tenement landlord may be
marginal, with increased likelihood of tort judgments possibly precipitating abandonment,
quaere whether the same can be said of all residential landlords not sharing the slumlord's
peculiar problems of taxes, maintenance and low income tenants.
116 Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961).
117 Under the civil law, an implied warranty is the rule and not the exception. See
note 21 supra. The civil law places an obligation to repair on the landlord and, in contrast to common law principles, the landlord is conclusively presumed to know of any
defects that make the leased property unsafe or uninhabitable. The landlord is absolutely
liable for injury caused by defects in the premises that are not the result of the tenant's
own actions. See generally Note, Liability of Lessor or Property Owner to Third Persons
for Accidental Personal Injury Caused by Defective Premises, 4 TULANE L RV. 611, 615
(1930).
See LA. Cv. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1952), which reads as follows:
The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects of the thing,
which may prevent its being used even in case it should appear he knew nothing
of the existence of such vices and defects, at the time the lease was made, and
even if they have arisen since, provided they do not arise from the fault of the
lessee; and if any loss should result to the lessee from the vices and defects, the
lessor shall be bound to indemnify him for the same.
See, e.g., Anslem v. Travelers Ins. Co., 192 So. 2d 599, 600 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
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and tenant lobbies could participate in formulating the scope of the
landlord's liability.
Nevertheless, judicial imposition of strict liability in tort through
an analogy to the law of products liability seems to have a basis in logic
and fairness.1 1 Strict liability in tort does not mean absolute liability
for every injury or harm simply by virtue of the ownership of property
on which a tenant is injured. 11 9 The courts and legislature have recognized the social and moral need for safe, decent housing. While rent
abatement and the other traditional remedies provide important weapons in the tenant's fight for fair treatment, the imposition of tort
liability in appropriate circumstances would provide a great incentive
20
for the landlord to maintain his premises in habitable condition.1
John Zen Jackson
118 An excellent argument for the imposition of strict tort liability and an analysis of
the movement of the California courts in that direction is presented in Note, Products
Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-Lessor, supra note 83, at 479-90.
119 The landlord could avoid or limit such "absolute" liability through inspection,
recourse against the original builder or supplier/manufacturer of a defective product in
the building, established products liability defenses such as assumption of the risk and
misuse and abuse of the product, and the requirement that the injury result from a defect.
See generally Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-Lessor, supra note
83, at 485-89.
120 Comment, Housing Codes and a Tort of Slumlordism, supra note 83, at 526.

